

# THE AMERICAN GO JOURNAL

Volume 2, Number 3

September, 1951

## FUKUDA GAMES

The first of the following games between Dr Walter W Marseille of San Francisco and our distinguished visitor Mr Masayoshi Fukuda, 6th Dan, has already been published in Japan and commented on by Mr Segoshi, 8th Dan. The players have also commented on various moves; we think our readers will find the different viewpoints of these comments interesting, and therefore give almost all of them below, identifying the commentator by the initial S, F, or M after each remark. It should be noted that those attributed to Mr Fukuda were made on the spur of the moment right after the game.

On the basis of his play in this and other games with Mr Fukuda, Dr Marseille has been given the title of amateur Shodan (first degree player) by Nippon Kiin.

The second of the following games, between Mr Kinsburg and the visiting master, at a handicap of seven stones, is given without comments. By way of experiment, and to save space, the diagrams of this game are not accompanied by Korschelt notation. We should like to have our readers' reaction to this space-saving expedient; if they find it not too inconvenient, we may employ it more often in the future.

### Fukuda - Marseille Game

Played in San Francisco, December 22, 1950. Time, 5 hours. Handicap 5 stones. Black won by 13 moku.

White	Black	White	Black
1 D6	F4	21 C15	E16
3 N17N	J17	23 B17	F17n
5 R13	P15n	25 L17	L16
7 R17	Q17	27 K17	J16n
9 R16	R15	29 N16	N15
11 S15	M16n	31 O15n	O14a
13 Q7	N3	33 K16	M14
15 C14	C8n	35 K15	H14n
17 F16	D14	37 L14	L13
19 D13	E14	39 K13	L12

This game was the last of three I had a chance to play against Mr Fukuda during his recent visit. It was not the first time we met. I had played three games with him more than 20 years ago in Berlin. At that time I won with a handicap of seven and lost with six. In the meantime Mr Fukuda had advanced from fifth degree to the sixth degree, and I knew that to win a game from him with a handicap of five was the highest goal I should set for myself at this time.

The first two games I lost through jeopardizing large groups in too aggressive attacks. I wanted badly to win this last game and resolved to play too cautiously rather than too boldly, reminding myself of the truth that a great majority of all games - not only on the Go board - are not decided by the superior play of the winner but by the mistakes of the loser. (M)

•3 N17. °1 and 3 are irregular - with the intent of seeing how B will defend himself. (S) Fukuda's first two plays are not the strongest possible, D6 being too close and provoking too much counter-pressure from B's answer at F4, and N17 being too far from Q16 to exert immediate pressure. Apparently, Mr Fukuda wanted to change the pace and play differently from the first two games. (M)

•6 P15. Instead •Q14, °Q13, •P14 would be stronger. (S) Note, however, Mr Segoshi's comment to •12. (M) •C9 or R7 would be better. (F)

•12 M16. If this was in B's mind when he played •6 P15, then that play was very strong. (S) Here we have one of the bewildering qualities of Japanese Go comments. Mr Segoshi seems to say now that •P15 is good if B makes use of the "shoulder" play M16 against W's N17. If that is really what he means, his earlier recommendation of •Q14 etc. instead of P15 merely points to an easier but not to a better play. Actually, P15 prepares for two such "shoulder" plays, M16 and Q12, and I was able to play both of them. (M)

(continued on next page)

## THE AMERICAN GO ASSOCIATION

## OFFICERS

## EDITORIAL BOARD

President: Boris John Kinsburg  
 First Vice-President: Max Steinbock  
 Second Vice-President: Guthrie McClain  
 Sec'y-Treas: Elizabeth E. Morris

Karl Davis Robinson, Chairman  
 Lester H. Morris, Associate Chairman  
 Edith J. Chernowitz

The American Go Journal is published by The American Go Association, 23 West 10th Street, New York 11, N.Y. Single copies: \$1.00. Annual Subscript-

tion (four issues) included with membership in The American Go Association. Membership fee: \$3.00 per year. Student subscription: \$1.00 per year.

Fukuda game (continued)

•16 C8. This is too close. (S) C9 or D10 would have been better. Then the weakness of •D6 would have shown (see comment to •1 and 3). (M)

•24 F17. This is Joseki, but too much of it. •J15 is better: it works both ways, nw as well as ne, and it settles the fate of W's N17. After •J15, B can watch which way W moves his F16. For instance, if •F17, •G14, and W cannot connect F17 with B17: •D18, •C16, •B16, •C18, •C17, •E18. (S). - My weak play F17 was the first adverse effect I had from my resolution to play a cautious game. (M)

•28 J16. •K16 is much stronger with the sequence: •J18, •H17, •O18, •R18. (S) - I played J16 on the assumption that I could reply to •K16 with •K15. It was only later that I found out that K15 was no good because of the two possible cuts on M15 and O15. (M)

•31 O15. Better to play K16

right away. With •O15, •O16 becomes necessary later. (F)

•36 H14. B's nw position is strong enough; for instance after •J15, •G16. Therefore, •L14 instead of H14. •L14 threatens to win three W stones by M17. After •37 L14 this is not any more the case. (S) •H14 is too small; •36 D11 is correct; e.g. •36 D11, •37 E13, •38 F13. (F)


White	Black	White	Black
41 O16n	Q12n	71 H12	C11n
43 N13n	N14	73 G17	G16a
45 Q13	P13	75 C12n	D11
47 P12n	P11a	77 Q3	R3
49 O12	O11	79 O3	R5n
51 N11	N10	81 N4	P3a
53 Q11an	R12	83 M3a	R9n
55 O10an	S13	85 D8	C6n
57 R11a	S12	87 C5	D5
59 P10(2)	S14n	89 C7	B6
61 Q18	P18	91 B7	E6a
63 R18	P17	93 D7	B5
65 O18	P19	95 F12	F10
67 T16n	M13n	97 F8	G9
69 K12	K11	99 G8	H8n

•41 O16. This is necessary. After the game Fukuda criticized his earlier play •31 O15 because W loses sente now. In other words, W should have played 31 K16 right away and O15 only if I had answered K16 with K15. - Upon analysis, I am not sure that this is correct since after •K16, •K15, •O15 the answer should be •N14 with the threat to cut at O16 and complications in favor of B.

The way we actually played W loses sente and B gets a chance to make the second "shoulder" play at Q12. After that play White's position is very difficult since B is well developed and safe everywhere while W's center group is still without eyes. (M)

•42 Q12. Very good. (S)

•43 N13. Watch the role of this man in the ensuing combination. (M)



Fukuda-Marseille 1 - 100

FUKUDA - MARSEILLE

•47 P12. This is not quite correct; but with a handicap of five W must sometimes play this way. R12 would not give W much of a chance. (S) I was sure that •P12 was "hamete" (a trick move that is hard to refute) and put everything into figuring out the many complications. •Q11 looks very strong; however, P11 leaves W fewer choices all the way through, and that is a most important factor in playing against a stronger opponent. (M)

•53 Q11. Q11 and 55 O10 are the only way. (S)

•55 O10. •S12, •R11 and then •Q10 with double threat would fail because of •N12 etc. (M)

•60 S14. Through 56 - 60, B won the game; •61 Q18 is undesirable for W because it weakens the W center group, but it cannot be omitted. (S)

•67 T16. Again, I came out with sente. When I took stock, I found my overall position quite favorable. From this I should have drawn the conclusion that a quiet position play such as R5 was indicated. Instead I recalled my good intentions of playing safely and connected at M13. Since my ne group is quite secure, this is carrying the good work too far. However, in making this play I had two other things in mind - I wanted to reinforce my center for B attacks against both the n and the e White groups. I realized only after the game was over that in both plans a purely emotional element was involved. With regard to W's n group I was annoyed at myself for having allowed •L14, which made •M17 a gote move. The psychological consequence was that I tried hard to include just this play in my later combinations. When I succeeded, I almost spoiled my game (see comment on •130 Q14). With regard to W's e group, I resented the loss of •O11 and P11 and therefore wanted to prove that this group was vulnerable to attack. I figured that after •M13, •S11 would not be sente any more and that, therefore a B attack at R9 might become possible some time later. In this case, too, resentment was not a good guide. I should have realized that W's e group was much too strong for such a close attack as R9. Again, when I executed my plan (see •84 R9), I jeopardized my chances. (M)

•68 M13. Not necessary - F6 or D11 would be better. (F)

•72 C11. This is not bad, but F12 is stronger. (S) D11 would still be better than C11. (F)

•75 C12. Undesirable for W but necessary. (S)


•80 R5. This is a funny move. B had two good possibilities; either •80 P3, •O4, •O2, •N2, •P2, or •80 O4, •P4, •P5, •P3, •R4, •N2, •N4, •M2, •Q2, •P2, •P1, •O2, •S2, •J3. (S) - I played R5 as a preparation for 84 R9, which was too close even with this preparation. (M) Instead of R5, 80 P3 right away would be better. If W replies Q2, then •O2, •O4, •N2 with advantage for B. (F)

•84 R9. I remember being quite proud of having executed my plan. But when Mr Fukuda played D8 without thinking long, I realized that my attack would have no chance, especially with W's new s group quite strongly established. (M) B should play H10 instead. (S) F6 would be better than R9. (F)

•86 C6. B should play C7 instead and answer •C6 with D7. (S) •86 C7 would be stronger, followed by •87 C6, •88 D7, •89 E6. (F)

•100 H8. Very strong. (F)

•161 at Q3



•104 K8. This causes an interesting fight. But it is fighting too much; •J10 was safer. (S) Again, we Americans do not know whether Mr Segoshi means J10 is the better move,

## FUKUDA - MARSEILLE

White	Black	White	Black
101 H9	H10a	151 S7	Q6a
103 J9	K8n	153 R7	P6
105 J10	J11n	155 P7	M10
107 H11a	G10	157 P2a	Q2(1)
109 J8a	H7	159 P4a	08n
111 J7	H6	161 Q3(1)	R2
113 K9	L10n	163 S5a	S4a
115 H13	J6	165 T6(1)	06
117 L9	M9	167 07	N6
119 L7	C9n	169 N7	M6
121 B10	D9	171 N8	L6
123 B11	B8	173 H2	G2
125 M11n	L11	175 D18	E18
127 S11	T14	177 D17	C16
129 T12n	Q14an	179 B16	E13
131 J18n	G18an	181 H18	H17(1)
133 A8	A9	183 G14	J14
135 A7	B9	185 F15	G15
137 E10	E9	187 F14	E17
139 F9	E8n	189 M17	K14
141 F11a	T18n	191 L15	H19
143 S18n	S16	193 K19	L4n
145 T17	Q19	195 L3	M15
147 J3	G3n	197 F7	E7
149 R6	S6	199 F6	J4

or whether he counsels the weaker player against creating complications - a counsel which certainly has its merits, viz. in case B creates too many complications so that he only confuses himself and does not know afterwards why his move did not work out. (M) This continuation of •100 is also very strong. (F)

•106 J11. B plays correctly from now to move 120. (S)

•114 L10. J12 may well be stronger, but it would create additional complications, and I had figured out that W would lose his sw group after •J6 and C9. (M)

•120 C9. This causes a semeai that is favorable for B. The outcome is decided now. (M)

•125 M11. W makes a last desperate attempt by attacking B's ne group. (M)

•129 T12. This play confused me. I had thought that •T14 was sente (which is correct) and that W could not afford to play T12. When Mr Fukuda did make that play, I concluded that there might be a seki for W in the corner, which would have been disastrous for B, who had no eyes yet himself (actually there is no chance of a seki) or a ko (which is correct, but the ko is favorable for B since

he has enough outer "liberties" in his group to win the ko fight for a very small compensation - incidentally this is what happened actually as the last action of the game). Therefore, I played 130 Q14, which was completely unnecessary.

I was attracted by this play especially because it gave me two eyes - with the help of that threat •M17 (see comments after •67). Should W try to destroy the eye on Q15 by •P16, B would play N18, •M18, •N19 (•O17 instead of M18 fails because of M17). Possessing eyes in my ne group I should not have to worry whether my attempt to kill the W ne group might lead to seki or ko. This looked good enough to me despite the over-caution inherent in Q14. However, through his next play W destroyed my eye at Q15 - and that without losing sente. This shook my morale quite a bit since I had not exactly expected Mr Fukuda to credit me with the knowledge of how to play against •P16. (M)

•130 Q14. Unnecessary. (S)

•131 J18. After this, •N18 does not make eyes against •P16, for instance: •P16, •N18, •M17, •O17, •N19, •M18, •M19, •L18, •L19, •O19, •K19.

•132 G18. If •H18, then •J15 becomes sente.

•140 E8. Ell is better. (S) - Certainly, Mr Segoshi must have wondered about this move, just as Mr Fukuda did. This was the first time that I made a weak move deliberately and against a strong player. I had figured out that with Ell I would win the whole W group, but that I would lose sente. Therefore, I played E8 in the hope that Mr Fukuda would play F11, which is worth about 20 points, and then I wanted to take the ne corner. It worked out fine. It would not have been so good for me if Mr Fukuda had played 141 T18 instead of F11 because •P16 would have been necessary then. After the game Mr Fukuda asked me about E8, and we had quite a laugh together when he realized that I had clinched my win through a premeditated "mistake". (M)

•142 T18. Normally S16 and then T18 is the correct way of capturing the corner when B has occupied T14, but in this case B has also a man on P19. (S)

•143 S18. Q19 would have offered more chances. (F)


## FUKUDA GAMES

- 148 G3. R7 is better here. (F)
- 160 O8. Q3 would have been better. (F)
- 194 L4. F7 is correct. (F)

[The record breaks off at this point, the result being a foregone conclusion. Beginners will have to take this statement on faith for the present; in our next issue we hope to have an article by Dr Marseille discussing the technique of estimating the score during the game.]

### FUKUDA - KINSBURG GAME

Played in New York, April 1951. Time, about 1 1/2 hours. Handicap, 7 stones. White won by about three moku.




Fukuda-Kinsburg 1 - 100

### EDITORIAL


Previous issues of the Journal have been typed on a proportional spacing typewriter, which resulted in a printed rather than a typed appearance. Circumstances beyond our control have made it necessary to shift to the use of an ordinary machine. We regret this, but trust that our readers, while not insensitive to appearance, are more interested in content.

On the subject of content, we cannot hope to completely please everyone, but we would appreciate more



Fukuda-Kinsburg 101 - 200

°157 at C11



Fukuda-Kinsburg 201 - 234

criticism than we have gotten. What about the general level of the articles? Should we carry more advanced material, or are we neglecting the needs of the beginner? Or is the balance about right? Ought we to increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the number of diagrams? Do we abbreviate too much, or use conventions which make reading difficult when there is a practical alternative?

Our own feeling is that more chit-chat would be welcome - would it? If so, supply it, readers.

## EVEN GAME JOSEKI

### PART 4

This installment of our series on Even Game Joseki (translated from Rüger's Das Go Spiel) considers the plays which may follow  $\bullet 1 E_4$ . This play permits White to occupy the corner, but in compensation Black can expand along the south border, or confine White to a small corner territory. Also Black always has easy access to the center after this play.

The only correct reply in this corner for White is  $2 C_4$ . After  $2 C_3$  White would be limited to a very small territory by  $\bullet 3 C_5$ ; even worse would be  $\bullet 2 C_5$  since Black would then occupy the corner with  $3 C_3$ , at the same time threatening the  $C_5$  stone. If White plays elsewhere on the board Black will soon continue with  $C_4$ , making a large corner.

After  $\bullet 1 E_4$ ,  $\bullet 2 C_4$ , Black can continue with  $C_3$  (Joseki 30, 31)  $C_5$  (Joseki 32, 33) or  $D_6$  (Joseki 34, 35, 36, 37).

Joseki 30




Diagram 30

$\bullet 4 B_3$ . This is the usual answer.  $J_3$  or  $K_3$  may also be played, but only when there are already White stones in the south-east corner.  $\bullet 4 B_5$  would be poor; this play was once used, in order to prevent Black from continuing effectively with  $B_4$  or  $D_4$ , but after  $\bullet 4 B_5$  Black plays  $5 B_3$ , and has a better position.

$\bullet 6 B_5$ . This looks insignificant, but is necessary. White now threatens to continue with  $E_5$  or  $D_7$ .

$\bullet 7 J_3$ . One can - in connection with friendly stones in the south-east corner - extend to  $K_3$  as shown in the next Joseki, or as far as  $L_3$ , but there is then always the threat of a White invasion in the large Black area. White now has two continuations, - Diagrams 30A and 30B.

A

$\circ 8 E_5$ . White can also play elsewhere, but if he wishes to continue in this corner,  $E_5$  is the only play worth considering.

$\circ 14 D_9$ . This cuts off the  $C_6$  stone. If  $\bullet 7$  had been at  $K_3$ , Black would have the more favorable position. For this reason White must avoid this continuation if Black has elected to play  $7 K_3$ , by playing  $8 D_7$  instead of  $8 E_5$ .




Diagram 30A

$\circ 8$  tenuki




Diagram 30B

B

If White elects to play elsewhere, Black can naturally follow suit, or he can continue here with  $C_6$  or  $E_6$ .  $\bullet 9 C_6$  leads to the position shown in Diagram 30B; White can continue with  $14 F_5$ ,  $G_5$  or  $G_7$ .  $\bullet 9 E_6$  would be answered with  $\circ 10 D_5$ . This reply is important. If White omits this play, Black continues with  $C_6$ ,  $\circ D_5$ ,  $\bullet D_6$  and White has a poor position. After  $\circ 10 D_5$  follows  $\bullet 11 E_5$ ; now White can play elsewhere. A  $B$  play at  $E_6$  is now no longer to be feared; there would follow  $\circ D_6$  and then after  $\bullet D_7$ ,  $\circ C_7$ .

After  $\bullet 11 E_5$  Black has indeed a strong outside position, but one must not forget that by playing stone 8 elsewhere White has gained the advantage in another part of the board, and now has sente.

Joseki 31

This Joseki is the same as that shown by Diagram 30, except that  $\bullet 7$  is at  $K_3$  instead of at  $J_3$ . When Black extends this far the point  $D_7$  becomes


#### Part 4

very important for both players. White may now play elsewhere, but if he wishes to continue here,  $\circ 8$  D7 is the only good play.

After  $\circ 8$  D7 there is a threat that W will invade with a play at G4 - or, if there are W stones around M3, with a play at H3. After  $\circ 8$  D7 Black has no choice but to fall back with a play at G2, for if he answers with something like E6 W continues the fight with J4. However, it would not be good for B to lose sente, after  $\circ 8$  D7, in order to prevent the threatened invasion. If he fears the invasion so much, then his play should be  $\bullet 7$  J3 rather than  $\bullet 7$  K3, or else  $\bullet 7$  L3 since after this play a protective stone at  $\bullet 9$  H4 in response to  $\circ 8$  D7 would be worth while, because it would enclose a large territory.

If W elects to play the 8th stone elsewhere, B must immediately continue with 9 D7, threatening to follow up with  $\bullet 11$  C6. W must answer 10 C6; B replies 11 D6 and W may now play elsewhere.

Joseki 32



$\bullet 5$  D5.  $\bullet 5$  C6 would be bad. However, W must know the correct sequence or he may easily get into difficulties. The proper play is:  $\circ 6$  D4,  $\bullet 7$  E5,  $\circ 8$  B6,  $\bullet 9$  C7,  $\circ 10$  E2,  $\bullet 11$  F2,  $\circ 12$  D2,  $\bullet 13$  G3 or F3.  $\circ 10$  E3 would be poor because  $\bullet 11$  F3,  $\circ 12$  E2,  $\bullet 13$  F2 and now B threatens C2 and in addition, with sente, D5 giving B a very strong position.  $\bullet 11$  E3, instead of  $\bullet 11$  F2 would not be good because  $\circ 12$  D2,  $\bullet 13$  F2,  $\circ 14$  F3 or D5. Similarly  $\circ 12$  D2 is better than  $\circ 12$  E3 since there would follow  $\bullet 13$  F3 with a sequence similar to that given in connection with the 10th play.

$\circ 6$  C6. There is no other good play.  $\circ 6$  B6 would be followed by  $\bullet 7$  C3.  $\bullet 7$  B6. Better, in general than  $\bullet 7$  B4, which is discussed in the next Joseki. One can always play 7 B6, but

7 B4 is correct only in particular circumstances.

$\circ 12$  D6. W can play elsewhere instead, but it is not desirable to do so unless there is a pressing necessity for such a play. In this case B would continue here with D7 and W has an uncomfortable position.  $\circ 12$  E7 would make a somewhat larger territory but would not be good because it would have no influence on B.

$\bullet 13$  F5. After  $\bullet 13$  E6 W would be in command of the situation here.

Joseki 33

$\bullet 7$  B4. With this play B prepares to take the C6 stone in Shicho and obtain influence toward the north.

$\circ 8$  B3. Not  $\circ 8$  B6, because of  $\bullet 9$  C3.




Diagram 33




Diagram 34

Joseki 34

$\bullet 3$  D6. B prepares to blockade the corner and extend toward the center.

$\circ 4$  E3. This is the customary reply; C6 is seldom good, as shown below. However, W can play elsewhere; if B then continues  $\bullet 5$  B5, W can again tenuki - the area he makes elsewhere will compensate for his inferior position here.

$\bullet 5$  F3. B might also elect  $\bullet 5$  D4 or  $\bullet 5$  D3.

$\circ 6$  D3. Now B can continue with F4 or F2.

A

$\bullet 7$  F4. Or B may play G4, which is practically equivalent. Either of these plays gives up Sente;  $\bullet 7$  F2 does not.

$\circ 8$  C6. This is not a bad play, but it is better for W to go elsewhere. Then B must not neglect to play B5 as soon as he can, which W must immediately answer with B4.

## EVEN GAME JOSEKI

• 11 D<sub>4</sub>. It would be very good for B to play elsewhere instead: • 10 D<sub>7</sub>, • 11 F<sub>7</sub>, • 12 D<sub>8</sub> would follow, and B can again play elsewhere.

• 13 D<sub>8</sub>. B has an excellent position; it is obvious now that • 8 C<sub>6</sub> is not generally to be recommended.




Diagram 34A




Diagram 34B


B

• 7 F<sub>2</sub>. W must now protect the corner or get into serious difficulties.

• 8 B<sub>6</sub>. This is usual reply. If W plays elsewhere there follows • 9 B<sub>5</sub>, • 10 B<sub>4</sub>, • 11 C<sub>5</sub>, • 12 D<sub>4</sub>, • 13 E<sub>5</sub>, • 14 B<sub>2</sub> or E<sub>2</sub>. The last play is necessary, or B plays C<sub>2</sub> and achieves Ko.

• 9 L<sub>3</sub>. M<sub>3</sub> is often played, depending on the situation in the south-east corner.

Joseki 35



• 7 C<sub>3</sub>. This is the usual continuation.

• 8 B<sub>3</sub>. C<sub>2</sub> would not be good because of • 9 B<sub>3</sub>.

• 17 G<sub>4</sub>. It would not have been good for either player to try to break away before this point in the sequence but now W can play elsewhere. The continuation shown, however, is very good.

Joseki 36

• 5 D<sub>3</sub>. With this play B starts a weighty battle; this play has less ex-




Diagram 36

ternal influence than the play given in the previous Joseki. Because there are many possible variations, mistakes on either side may easily be made.

A

• 9 B<sub>4</sub>. By no means E<sub>5</sub> instead, because of • 10 B<sub>3</sub>, after which the black stones would be lost.

• 12 F<sub>4</sub>. If B now plays D<sub>5</sub>, • K<sub>3</sub> is good. If B does not elect to play D<sub>5</sub>, then W may cut at E<sub>5</sub> and has several good continuations.




Diagram 36A




Diagram 36B

B

• 10 B<sub>4</sub>. A frequent alternative is F<sub>3</sub>, - particularly when after • 11 B<sub>4</sub> the E<sub>4</sub> stone can be caught in sho with • 12 E<sub>5</sub>.

• 18 C<sub>7</sub>. G<sub>2</sub> would not be good here.

Joseki 37

• 4 C<sub>6</sub>. This play is in general not as good as • 4 E<sub>3</sub>. However, it is frequently used, particularly if for some reason • 4 E<sub>3</sub> is undesirable, or if there is already a white stone for the ladder (which develops after the 11th play of Diagram 37A) to run to.

• 6 D<sub>7</sub>. D<sub>5</sub> would be poor; there would follow • 7 E<sub>5</sub>, • 8 D<sub>7</sub>, • 9 E<sub>6</sub>, • 10 C<sub>8</sub>, • 11 B<sub>7</sub>, • 12 D<sub>9</sub>, • 13 E<sub>7</sub>, • 14 D<sub>8</sub>, • 15 C<sub>3</sub>, • 16 B<sub>6</sub>, • 17 B<sub>4</sub>. (Note: not • 16 B<sub>3</sub>, whence • 17 B<sub>5</sub>, • 18 C<sub>5</sub>,

## Part 4

- 19 B4, • 20 D3, • 21 C2, • 22 D4,
- 23 D2, • 24 E3, • 25 F3, • 26 E2,
- 27 F2 and the white stones are lost.)

• 8 B6. B must now govern his play by whether or not the ladder, which comes about after a play at • 9 E6, will catch the D7 stone or not. If the ladder works for B, he plays as shown in Diagram 37A; otherwise, as in 37B.




Diagram 37

A  
• 10 B5. C8 would not be good because of • 11 B5, • 12 B7+1, • 13 D4.  
• 11 D8. Because the stone on D7 can be caught in the ladder, the play • 12 C6 was not good in this case. W should have played 12 E3 or on some other part of the board. On the other hand, he may gain advantage by playing • 12 N16 or thereabouts at this time. It may be advisable for B to avoid this sort of double-purpose white stone by electing Joseki 37B.




Diagram 37A





Diagram 37B

### PROBLEMS

The problems in this issue are somewhat of a change of diet from those previously given. The first two were shown to us by Mr Fukuda, to illustrate a general principle that in a symmetrical situation the "center" is the best play. In Problem 1 Black is to break out of the encirclement;


Problem 1



Problem 2

in Problem 2 he is to play and survive in the K3 region.

Problem 3 is a full board problem; Black is to play and win the game. We are indebted to Mr Takashima for this problem, which is from the collection of Nichiren. Solutions will be found on page 48.



Problem 3

## EVEN GAME FUSEKI

## MANEUVER SIX

Black 1. R16 3. P16 5. D4	White 2. P4 4. E16
------------------------------------	--------------------------

- 5 is an aggressive counter-position to W's two high corner placements.

6. R4  
8. C17  
10. D16

•9 could have been played at B17 according to the usual Joseki. In the present case B has decided to sacrifice the corner advantage in order to consolidate the upper side territory with •9 and •11 thereby deriving maximum benefit from his first two plays.

11. M16                    12. C15

If ♦3 were lower, at P17 or O17, then M16 would not be advisable. B would play 11 C15, followed by ♦12 D18 and ♦13 C12.

•13. K3

Threatening •15 N3. R10 was also good here.

14. F3

• 14 M3 was a possible alternative.

15. E3	16. F4
17. D6	18. M3
19. K5	20. J4

•20 J4 has the disadvantage of strengthening the opponent's position, but it is a logical preparation for W's dash to the center.

21. K4

Should B omit this, the subsequent development would be very complicated.

22. G7

It would not be good for W to play G7 without "peeking" at J4 first. B would answer with •21 M5, and if W played elsewhere, •23 N3 would be very bad for W.

23. M4 24. N4

Should W consolidate at N3 intending  
•26 K7, B would play •25 J7.

25. N5 26. M5

If B had played 25 M5, he would be allowing W a valuable sente. To avoid this, B sacrifices his stone at M4.


27. M6	28. L4+
29. L5	30. M4
31. L7	

B could omit this fortification and occupy R10. Should W cut at L6 there would follow: •33 K6, °34 L7, •35 K7, °36 L8, •37 K8, °38 L9, •39 K9; or •33 K6, °34 L7, •35 K7, °36 M7, •37 K9.

32. R10

•33 might be played at R12 with considerable advantage. Should W occupy D9, B would have two attractive choices: one, a squeeze attack R8 on •32; the other a great territorial scheme at P11.

In the present diagram, if W should play  $\textcircled{3}4$  R13, B may counter with a diagonal attack at Q9 and then cap the isolated W position from G9.



## EVEN GAME FUSEKI

MANEUVER NO. 7

Black  
1. R16  
3. D17  
5. C11

White  
2. Q5  
4. C15

B might have played at C5 instead. In that case, should W answer by playing D3, B could follow with C11.

6. F15

•6 is a temporary preventive against a B play at C16. B's extension is indispensable.

7. G17

8. E4

W awaits a B play at C4, intending the following development: •9 C4, •10 C3, •11 B3, •12 D3, •13 B5, •14 D7, •15 C6, •16 D6, •17 C8, •18 D8, •19 C9.

This would make •5 appear very foolish.

9. Q3  
11. R9

10. R3

Instead of the more usual joseki play at R2, B has decided to occupy this post on the right hand side. This is a virtual concession of the corner advantage to W.

12. P17

Preventing B from monopolizing the upper side, and threatening to play •Q15.

13. Q14

•Q15 was a good alternative.

15. P3  
17. M3

14. Q4  
16. S4  
18. C4

If W played C9, B would either dash to E11 or start a daring counter-attack at C4. W's corner closure and B's subsequent extension to C8 are more moderate.

19. C8  
21. Q17

20. K3

•20 and •21 are equally effective.

22. O4

23. M5

Countering •22 by playing •23 O3 would not be good. It would weigh down the B formation, and allow W the following advantageous sequence: •23 O3, •24 N4, •25 M4, •26 L2, •27 M2, •28 K5.

24. K5

For if W seizes the two B stones by playing O3, B invades the W territory at H3.


25. P9

This is a very important post. If B desired to occupy the lower side he would play M2, which would either rescue the two B stones on the right or pave the way for an invasion at H3. P9 is preferred as a vantage point for general maneuvering and a preventive against a W attack at Q10.

26. O3  
27. O5  
29. M7  
31. C18  
33. E17  
35. D14

28. O2  
30. C17  
32. D16  
34. B17

An exceedingly interesting play. Notice that B has invited •36 E16 so that he may press at G15 on his next play, thereby forcing the operation into •38 G14, •39 H15, and securing great advantage for himself. •35 might also have been played at P16 to



Maneuver 7: 1 - 39

## HANDICAP JOSEKI

### Part 7

#### The Scissors Joseki

After W has attacked the D4 handicap stone by a play at F3, followed by •2 C7, W may continue with •3 D3. This line of play is often selected when the objective is to re-inforce the F3 stone. After •3 D3, B must invariably prevent further invasion of the corner by playing •4 C3, whereupon W will usually cut with •5 C4, with the intention of sacrificing this stone in the course of further play.

The position thus arrived at (illustrated below) is called the "scissors Joseki". The opportunities for somewhat complicated development are many, and for this reason this Joseki is often favored by the superior player. After a reasonable amount of study and after noting particularly the plays which lead to the strongest continuations, B has little to fear, however.

How can B best protect himself? The beginner, confronted with this position for the first time, will usually reply •6 C5 or •6 B4. Both plays are possible, and will be considered in the following discussion, but neither is the most secure play available in the given situation. The strongest reply is •6 D5.

#### Joseki 1

•9 E2. If W plays •9 B2, the continuation is •10 E3, •11 D2, •12 B4, •13 E4, •14 E5, •15 F4. W would have a slightly better position than after •9 E2, but would have lost sente, so that •9 B2 is not recommended. Similarly •9 D2 is weaker than •9 E2, but W may select this play in order to lead B into errors. The correct sequence is •10 B2 •11 C9. By this play W threatens an invasion, continuing with B6; if B now replies B7, W follows with B4, and the black stones around C3 are lost. The mistake is •B7 - the correct play is •B5.

•12 C5. This is important. If B plays 12 B4 instead, there would follow •13 C8, •14 B8, •15 B9, •16 B7; it is disadvantageous for B to give W the opportunity of playing C8 and B9 with sente. B could not cut with 16 C9, for example, instead of playing 16 B7;

there would follow •17 D8, •18 B10, •19 B7, •20 A9+1, •21 C6, •22 D7, •23 D6, •24 E7, •25 E6. One sees how important the •12 C5 play is!




Diagram 1




Diagram 2

#### Joseki 2

•9 B3. W must not let •8 B5 mislead him into playing •9 B4 - B would answer B3 with sente, and then cut off the D3 stone.

•10 C2. Two possible continuations are shown in Diagrams 2A and 2B.

#### A

The best continuation from the position of Diagram 2A is: •14 E3, •15 C8, •16 D7, •17 B6, •18 F4.

Not quite as good would be •14 B4, •15 B6, •16 B2, •17 C8, (Here •17 D2 would be poor because of •18 C8, •19 B8, •20 F4, •21 G3 or B9 - and B has a better position than after •17 C8.) •18 E3, •19 D7+1, (after •19 F4 would follow •20 D7, and B soon plays K3) •20 F4. B's position is not quite as good as after •14 E3.




Diagram 2A




Diagram 2B

#### •18 at D3

## Part 7

B

The best continuation from the position of Diagram 2B is: •20 E6, •21 D7, •22 F6, •23 D8, •24 F4, •25 C10. 20 B7 may also be played, but leads to a more complicated situation and is not generally recommended.

Joseki 3

•11 B6. After •11 B3, •12 C2, •13 B7 we would have the same position as after the 13th play in Joseki 2A above.

•13 B4. Not •13 C2 because •14 B3, •15 B4, •16 D2, •17 E3, •18 B2, •19 D7, •20 A5 and the white stones die.

•14 E3. After •14 B3 (not as good) follows •15 B2.

•24 H4. B can later Play E1, threatening to kill with B2.




Diagram 3




Diagram 4

Joseki 4

•8 C6. This is not quite as good as •8 E3, which is discussed below (Joseki 5).

•11 B6. This play, in conjunction with •13 D2, is really not correct, but W can try it to see whether or not B will find the proper answer for the 16th play. If B errs, the situation is very pleasant for W!

•16 A2! B must not make the mistake of playing A3 instead; •16 A2 kills, but •16 A3 leads to ko, thus: •17 A2, •18 A1+1, •19 A4.

Joseki 5

If instead of 8 C6 B plays 8 E3, W replies 9 D2. B may now continue with C2, C6 or E2; the first two choices are preferred to the third, C6 being particularly good if there is a black stone at K3. Diagrams 5A, 5B and 5C show the lines of play which result from •C2, •C6 and •E3 respectively.

A

•15 B6. If •15 B4, then •16 A2 is a good answer.

•17 B4. If •17 B5, then •18 A6.

•18 A2. Not •18 A3, which leads to ko through •19 A2, •20 A1+1, •21 A4, •22 A5, •23 A2+1.

B

•11 B3. An alternative is •11 C2, but •11 E2 would not be acceptable, because B would capture two stones after •12 B4.

•14 F4. Now W cannot cut with •15 D6 because •16 E7, •17 E6, •18 F6, •19 F5, •20 G5.




Diagram 5A




Diagram 5B





Diagram 5C

Joseki 6

•9 D2. Now B can continue at a or b. E2 is generally better; E4 may be used if B is strong in the center and wants to gain sente.

The sequence after •10 E2 is •11 E4, •12 D5, •13 F2, •14 B3.




One sequence which may follow •10 E4 is: •11 E2, •12 B3, •13 B5, (•13 F4 may be played instead) •14 B6, •15 D5, •16 E5, •17 C6+1, •18 D6, •19 B2, •20 C5+2, •21 C2. It appears as if W had won an advantage in the corner, but B has a better position, for after he has captured two stones he can expand broadly. •16 E5 is to be noted. Even if the three stones could not be captured in shicho, •16 C6 would not be as good because of the answer •17 F5! •16 A4 is also not to be recommended: it indeed threatens to catch the whites in shicho after •17 C6+1, •18 A5, but

## HANDICAP JOSEKI

W would not play °17 C6 - instead he would answer °17 E5, and B's position would be poor.

Another sequence which might follow °10 E4 is: °11 B5, °12 E2, °13 C6, °14 D6, °15 D5+1, °16 E5, °17 C2, °18 C5+1, °19 B6, °20 E8. B has a good position toward the center.

Joseki 7



•8 B3. If there are white stones in the direction of C9, it is better to play •8 D5.

•10 D5. A good play! If B were to play C6 instead, in order to catch the white stones on the border, W would be able to play E3 with sente. B would have to guard against a W play at D5, and W would then capture the B3 and C3 stones by playing B2.

•11 B2. Reinforces, with sente, the D3 stone and works toward making possible the flight of the white stones on the border.

•12 C2. If there are white stones near C9, it is better for B to play •12 E3, °13 D2, •14 E2, °15 C2, •16 F4. •14 A2. Not °14 B1 because •15 A2, •16 A3, °17 B6, •18 B7, °19 D1 and the blacks are lost.

°15 B6. Not 15 B1 because of •16 B6.

•16 B1+. Now W can continue with 17 C6, which leads to the sequence shown in Diagram 7A. °17 B7 would not be good, as Diagram 7B shows; in this




Diagram 7A




Diagram 7B

and similar situations it is not advantageous for B to press too hard - rather he should let W creep along the second line.

Joseki 8

°11 B5. If W connects instead, with a play at E3, B can win two stones by playing B5. If for any reason °11 B5 is not playable, °11 E5 is a good alternative.

•12 E3. •12 C6 would lead to °13 E3!

•14 F4! If W now plays elsewhere, B can continue here with B7. If however W plays °15 B7 or D7, B can play elsewhere.

•18 at D3




Diagram 8



Diagram 9

Joseki 9

•6 B4 leads to the positions shown in Diagrams 9, 10 and 11.

Possible continuations from the position reached in Diagram 9 are °19 A4+ (Diagram 9A) or, preferably, °19 D7 (Diagram 9B).




Diagram 9A




Diagram 9B

Diagram 9B

•20 C8. The reply to •20 D8 would be °21 C8.

°23 F2. White thereby gives up the corner.

°29 G5. White can still play B6, threatening a Ko fight.

(continued on page 48)

### An Interesting Letter

[The following is an extract from a private letter from Dr. Ralph H. Fox, of Princeton University to our editor, Mr. Karl Davis Robinson.

We invite comments from other Go players, particularly in regard to the proposed tentative ranking of Go players in the United States, to be published in our Journal. - The Editors]

Recently a game I played with N.E. Steenrod resulted in a situation which I do not know how to resolve. Knowing your interest in the rules of Go I pass it on to you. White to play, does the black group die, or does the white group die, or is it a seki? (See Diagram 1) Obviously an absolute rule of no third repetition of any position would settle this, but I don't seem to recollect such a rule. Whoever tries to get off the merry-go-round loses about 30 points.




Diagram 1 - Chosei

I believe I have detected several errors in the discussions of Joseki in the Go Journal. In issue four, volume one, page 59, see Diagram 27. After White 39 G1, the black group is dead. For no matter what Black's 40th play (with one trivial exception) White plays 41 A1. I think Black's error was his 34th move; I would continue 34 A4, 35 A3+, 36 A6 and the white group dies. Therefore White 33 was also an error and should have been played at B5 (not at D1); this really seems to produce a Seki as required. This Joseki is correctly given in the Go Dictionary, volume one, #215.

[Mr. Fox is obviously correct. We suggest that readers make a note to this effect in their copies of Vol. 1 No. 4.

The Editors]

I find that Ruger (I suppose it is Ruger I am criticizing) does not agree with the Go Dictionary very well and I am inclined to suspect his reliability. In the even game Joseki there are also questionable comments. For instance in (same issue as above) Diagram 4 and variant P51, the comment "After this opening Black is not advised to play 5 E4 ..." is misleading. In fact it is a very good play if White D4 can be answered by Black 7 D3, White 8 D5, Black 9 C3. This is a correct play if the White ladder is no good in which case according to the Go Dictionary "White is ruined". On page 50 of the same issue the comments of Diagram 2-1 seem to be at variance with the Go Dictionary. White 4 E5 and White 4 D5 which Ruger says are less desirable plays are apparently preferred in the Go Dictionary. On page 51 Diagram 6-1 (nikken besami) two important White moves 4 D6 and 4 G5 are not mentioned.

[It is regrettably true that our Joseki series, adapted from Ruger's work, is not as exhaustive as Suzuki's three volume Go Dictionary, and contains some errors. Corrections and additions will be welcome!]

It occurs to me that the Go Journal could provide a real service by publishing a list of Go players in this country together with some kind of ranking of their playing ability. There are, I think, three objections to this proposal: 1) Difficulty of securing rating. The ranking would have to be based on whatever evidence is procurable and could not hope to be complete, or even totally consistent. 2) Comparisons are invidious. Some players may be sensitive about their ability and one would not want to start any feuds. I think this might be obviated by making the categories rather broad, say a division into five or six classes. 3) The Journal's list includes only members (dues paying) although there are many good players who for various reasons sufficient to themselves are not members. I don't know the proper answer for 3). At any

### FOX LETTER (continued)

rate it would be a worth-while endeavor and would sometimes make it possible for isolated players of approximately even strength to get together.

[As a beginning, each group of players (Princeton, San Francisco, etc., etc.) could send us a list of comparative ratings within the group, counting down from Shodan strength by ranks, letting each stone of handicap equal two ranks, and also giving any cross reference to other groups which may be available. This could be used as a basis for a rating into broad categories such as Fox suggests. The Editor.]

Sincerely,

Ralph H. Fox

In a subsequent letter to the Secretary, Dr Fox continued his discussion of the corner situation illustrated in the diagram above:

"I have recently learned from Mr Fukuda that this position is known to the Japanese and is called "Chosei" - literally, live long. It has never occurred in any recorded game and its resolution has not been agreed on as of this date. In this respect it differs from the better known Utazu-san-moku which was arbitrarily decided by Honinbo [Shusai?] to be worth 3 points for white [see diagram 2]. The only reasonable resolution that I can imagine is a rule forbidding repeated positions (as I understand it, this is a rule in Yasunaga's revised rules and in the Robinson-Olmsted rules.) With this rule a most remarkable situation would develop, in that white (or, a move later, black) would win no matter how many ko threats the opponent has, because the position would, in effect, be a one-sided ko. That is, played as a ko, black (or white) would have to find external ko-threats while white (or black) would be under no such compulsion."




Diagram 2 - Utazu-san-moku

### EVEN GAME FUSEKI (continued from p 43)

attack the isolated W stone. Should W answer this by occupying J17, B would simply fortify his position with •37 Bl8.

36. E16

37. G15

39. H15

Should W now play •40 F16, it would suffice for B to counter with •41 H17. If B seizes F16, W will be obliged to defend his position by playing E14, and B can continue the attack with •43 C14 and •45 B15.

### HANDICAP JOSEKI (continued from p 46)

Joseki 10

•10 E3. A notable play.

Joseki 11

•10 B5. Black will choose this play when he wishes to attack from above. Naturally this play is not appropriate at the beginning of a game.

